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	 .5w − l + pl − .5T > .5w − l 	
Which	is	true	if:	






























































































































































































































































































































































































Hire α 1−η( )y, 1−α( ) 1−η( )y α 1−η( )y + r, 1−α( )y − r
Don 't α y − r, 1−α( ) 1−η( )y + r α y, 1−α( )y
	
Hiring	facilitating	labor	is	the	strictly	dominant	strategy	for	all	values	of	r>αηy and	




















































































	 	 N = L +φH + 1−φ( )H +U 	 	 	 	 	 			 (1)	
Where	N	is	the	size	of	the	total	labor	force,	L	is	the	number	of	low-skill	workers	
employed,	H	is	the	number	of	high-skill	workers,	φ is	the	proportion	of	high-skill	
workers	employed	in	output	related	activities,	 1−φ( ) 	is	the	proportion	of	high-skill	
workers	employed	as	facilitating	labor,	and	U	is	the	number	of	unemployed	low-skill	
workers.	The	employment	rate	of	low-skill	workers	is	therefore	defined	as:	
	 	 e = L
L +U
















		 	 	 	 	 	 													 (4)	
Where	the	rate	of	capacity	utilization	is	given	by	u = Y /K .	
	 Assuming	that	only	high-skill	workers	are	hired	as	facilitating	labor	it	is	
possible	to	write	the	total	wage	bill	being	paid	to	facilitating	labor	as:	


















































































wR − E wL[ ]( )e−rt dt ≥C∫ 	 	 	 	 	 	 (10)	
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= s u,η,σW ,τ( )
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= s u,η,σW ,τ( ) = n 		 	 	 	 	 	 (19)	
Since	n,	η ,	σW ,	and	τ 	are	all	exogenous	variables,	equation	19	determines	a	unique	
equilibrium	value	of	the	utilization	rate:	


















= f u 1−η −σW ,τ( ),1−η −σW ,e( ) = n 		 	 	 	 (21)	
Again,	since	n,	η ,	σW ,	and	τ 	are	all	exogenous	variables,	equation	21	determines	a	
unique	equilibrium	low-skill	employment	rate:	










= euuη + eσπ −1( ) 	
Since	 eu > 0 ,	uη > 0 ,	and	 eσπ > 0 	the	effect	of	an	increase	in	the	facilitating	labor	
share	of	income	on	the	rate	of	employment	is	negative	if:	















	 	 wOφH +wLL =σWY 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (23)	
Using	equations	4,	8,	and	23	the	wage	paid	to	high-skill	workers	participating	in	
output	activities	can	be	written	as:	
	 	 wO =
τ
1+τ
σW 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (24)	
Using	equations	5,	17,	and	24	it	can	be	shown	that	the	equilibrium	proportion	of	
high-skill	workers	employed	in	output	related	activities	is:	















































































= f η,ψ η,τ( ),e( ) = n 	 	 	 	 	 									 (30)	
Which	can	be	written	as:	























		 	 	 	 	 	 (32)	
The	effect	of	an	increase	in	the	share	of	income	going	to	facilitating	labor	is	negative	
if:	
	 	 ψη <ψ η,τ( ) 	























































































































































































































































































































































	 	 Ŷ = h 1−η −σ w ,e( ) 																																																																											 (10)	
Along	the	balanced	growth	path,	the	growth	rate	of	output	and	the	saving	rate	(the	
growth	rate	of	the	capital	stock)	must	be	equal	to	the	growth	rate	of	the	labor	force:	
	 	 n = s η,σ w( ) = h 1−η −σ w,e( ) 	 	 	 	 	 (11)	
Using	equation	11,	it	is	possible	to	write	the	wage	share	as	a	function	of	the	
facilitating	labor’s	share:	








	 	 	h 1−η −ψ η( ),e( ) = n 	 	 	 	 	 	 (13)	
This	requires	that:	
	 	 e = e 1−η −ψ η( )( ) = e η( ) 	 	 	 	 	 	 (14)	
An	increase	inη has	an	unambiguously	negative	effect	on	the	employment	rate	if:	






	 		 wO =
τ
1+τ











	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (17)	
An	increase	in	η reduces	φ* 	if:	

















































	 	 avgŶ = β0 + β1 lnYi + β2Si + β3Ri + β4Xi + avgGi + ε i 	
Where	avgŶ 	is	the	average	growth	rate	of	real	personal	income	per	capita,	β0 	is	the	
































































































































































































































Variable								 	 Obs.						Mean	 	 S.D.	 	 Min			 	 Max	
Growth					 	 1008				0.012	 					 0.023		 	 -0.115				 .099	
STEM					 	 1008				0.179					 0.027		 	 0.115					 0.306	
Rent						 	 1008				0.354					 0.044		 	 0.224					 0.515	
lnRPI					 1008			 10.519					 0.170	 	 10.058							 11.048		
Gov.	Spending						 		1008				0.120					 	 0.025		 	 0.073					 0.207	







































































































































	 	 (1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	 	 (4)	
lnRPI				 -0.010***								 -0.007**									 -0.006*		 -0.006	
									 	 (0.003)		 (0.003)		 (0.003)		 (0.004)	
STEM										 	 	 0.002				 -0.018			 -0.019	
																	 	 	 (0.023)		 (0.024)		 (0.024)	
Rent													 	 	 -0.046***								 -0.039***								 -0.040***	
																	 	 	 (0.013)		 (0.011)		 (0.013)	
Ba's/Population																		 	 	 0.156**	 	0.156**	
																									 	 	 	 	 (0.067)		 (0.067)	
Gov.	Spending																												 	 	 	 -0.003	
																																	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.022)	
Constant				 0.118***					 0.098***									 0.086**		 0.088**	
									 	 (0.032)		 (0.034)		 (0.035)		 (0.040)	


















	 	 (5)	 	 (6)	 	 (7)	 	 (8)	
lnRPI				 -0.015***								 -0.012***								 -0.012***								 -0.015***	
									 	 (0.003)		 (0.004)		 (0.004)		 (0.004)	
STEM													 	 	 -0.002			 -0.004			 -0.017	
																	 	 	 (0.028)		 (0.029)		 (0.033)	
Rent													 	 	 -0.086***								 -0.085***								 -0.105***	
																	 	 	 (0.016)		 (0.016)		 (0.017)	
Ba's/Population																		 	 	 0.012				 0.024	
																									 	 	 	 	 (0.084)		 (0.094)	
Gov.	Spending																												 	 	 	 -0.078***	
																																	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.029)	
Constant				 0.166***									 0.169***									 0.169***									 0.215***	
									 	 (0.031)		 (0.041)		 (0.041)		 (0.048)	
Obs	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	


























	 	 (9)	 	 (10)	 	 (11)	 	 (12)	
lnRPI				 -0.034***								 -0.049***								 -0.056***								 -0.052***	
(0.005)		 (0.008)		 (0.009)		 (0.011)	
STEM													 	 	 0.133**		 0.172**		 0.181***	
(0.064)		 (0.067)		 (0.061)	
Rent													 	 	 -0.207***								 -0.177***							 -0.179***	
(0.026)		 (0.027)		 (0.030)	
Ba's/Population																		 	 	 0.609**		 0.604**	
(0.235)		 (0.240)	
Gov.	Spending																												 	 	 	 -0.173	
(0.126)	
Constant				 0.368***									 0.577***									 0.604***									 0.581***	
(0.057)		 (0.091)		 (0.098)		 (0.101)	
Obs	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	








































	 	 (13)	 	 (14)	 	 (15)	 	 (16)	 	 (17)	
Diff	in	Diff					 0.004**		 0.004**		 0.005***									 0.005***				 0.005***	
									 	 (0.002)		 (0.002)		 (0.002)		 (0.002)		 (0.002)	
Treatment								 0.000					 0.002					 0.001					 0.001					 0.000	
									 	 (0.001)		 (0.001)		 (0.001)		 (0.001)		 (0.001)	
Post	1994								 0.002***									 0.003***									 0.004***									 0.004***									 0.005***	
									 	 (0.001)		 (0.001)		 (0.001)		 (0.001)		 (0.001)	
lnRPI												 	 	 -0.008**									 -0.008**									 -0.008**									 -0.011***	
																	 	 	 (0.004)		 (0.004)		 (0.003)		 (0.003)	
Growth																			 	 	 	 -0.077***								 -0.073***								 -0.078***	
																									 	 	 	 	 (0.023)		 (0.022)		 (0.022)	
Ba's/Population																										 	 	 	 	 -0.115**									 -0.101*	
																																	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.057)		 (0.055)	
Gov.	Spending																																				 	 	 	 	 	 -0.066***	
																																									 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.015)	
Constant				 0.020***									 0.100***								 	0.104***									 0.106***									 0.148***	
									 	 (0.001)		 (0.037)		 (0.037)		 (0.036)		 (0.035)	
















































































































































































































































































































































































































	 	 (18)	 	 (19)	 	 (20)	 	 (21)	
lnRPI				 -0.011***								 -0.005*		 -0.007**									 -0.008**	
									 	 (0.003)		 (0.003)		 (0.003)		 (0.004)	
STEM													 	 	 0.005				 0.008				 0.007	
																	 	 	 (0.026)		 (0.024)		 (0.024)	
Rent													 	 	 -0.048***								 -0.041**									 -0.043***	
																	 	 	 (0.018)		 (0.016)		 (0.016)	
Ba's/Population																		 	 	 0.127**		 0.128**	
																									 	 	 	 	 (0.051)		 (0.053)	
Gov.	Spending																												 	 	 	 -0.007	
																																	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.026)	
Constant	 0.128***									 0.086***									 0.097***									 0.102**	
									 	 (0.036)		 (0.027)		 (0.031)		 (0.038)	







	 	 (22)	 	 (23)	 	 (24)	 	 (25)	
lnRPI				 -0.015***								 -0.010***								 -0.012***								 -0.015***	
									 	 (0.003)		 (0.003)		 (0.004)		 (0.004)	
STEM													 	 	 0.022				 0.027				 0.017	
																	 	 	 (0.032)		 (0.033)		 (0.035)	
Rent													 	 	 -0.073***								 -0.069***								 -0.087***	
																	 	 	 (0.016)		 (0.016)		 (0.018)	
Ba's/Population																		 	 	 0.070				 0.081	
																									 	 	 	 	 (0.049)		 (0.055)	
Gov.	Spending																												 	 	 	 -0.076***	
																																	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.028)	
Constant				 0.166***									 0.144***									 0.157***									 0.199***	
									 	 (0.031)		 (0.035)		 (0.036)		 (0.043)	
Obs	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	










	 	 (26)	 	 (27)	 	 (28)	 	 (29)	 	 	
lnRPI				 -0.034***								 -0.047***								 -0.059***								 -0.055***	
									 	 (0.005)		 (0.008)		 (0.011)		 (0.013)	
STEM													 	 	 0.091				 0.139*			 0.139*	
																	 	 	 (0.073)		 (0.080)		 (0.077)	
Rent													 	 	 -0.236***								 -0.201***								 -0.205***	
																	 	 	 (0.031)		 (0.033)		 (0.036)	
Ba's/Population																		 	 	 0.413**		 0.395**	
																									 	 	 	 	 (0.162)		 (0.169)	
Gov.	Spending																												 	 	 	 -0.146	
																																	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.131)	
Constant				 0.368***									 0.575***									 0.654***									 0.634***	
									 	 (0.057)		 (0.089)		 (0.108)		 (0.113)	
Obs		 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	 	 192	 	 	
































Treatment	 	 	 Control	
	
California	 	 	 Alabama	
Colorado	 	 	 Arkansas	
Delaware	 	 	 Idaho	
Georgia	 	 	 Indiana	
Massachusetts	 	 Kentucky	
New	Hampshire	 	 Louisiana	
Utah	 	 	 	 Maine	
Virginia	 	 	 Michigan	
Washington	 	 	 Mississippi	
	 	 	 	 Nevada	
	 	 	 	 New	Mexico	
	 	 	 	 Oregon	
	 	 	 	 Pennsylvania	
	 	 	 	 South	Carolina	
	 	 	 	 South	Dakota	
	 	 	 	 Tennessee	
	 	 	 	 West	Virginia	
	 	 	 	 Wisconsin	
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